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This paper examines the influence of governments' discretionary measures on tax revenues 
and tax elasticity in the European Union during the run-up to the 2008/2009 global financial 
crisis which was characterised by large swings in tax revenues. Using data collected in the 
context of the Output Gap Working Group of the Economic Policy Committee we show that 
while discretionary measures have had a limited impact on tax yields, they have in some 
cases significantly affected tax elasticities and thereby altered the relationship between tax 
revenues and the business cycle which plays a key role in the EU fiscal surveillance 
framework. Furthermore we provide evidence on the pro-cyclical nature of discretionary 
measures affecting tax revenues whereby governments tend to implement tax cuts during 
expansionary phases while resorting to tax increases during slowdowns. More generally our 
results suggest that the availability of detailed projections on the impact of discretionary 
measures by broad tax category would be instrumental to a better monitoring of tax 
revenues developments in the EU in order to better identify the role played by non-policy 
factors (such as asset prices) in driving tax revenues. Given that the time span covered by 
this database is in most cases still relatively short (covering on average 7 to 8 years) future 
updates of the data would allow to further dig into the issue of the influence of discretionary 
measures on tax elasticities as well as to provide elements for a backward assessment of 
fiscal plans vs. outcome. 
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Commission. 1. Introduction 
The analysis of short-run variations in tax revenues and their link to the business cycle 
generally ignores the influence of discretionary policy changes affecting the tax collection. 
The latter, in particular, implies that the estimated cyclical component of tax revenues can 
possibly include policy-led changes. At present no systematic information on the estimated 
impact of discretionary measures on tax revenues and tax elasticities has been performed at 
EU level although existing, albeit limited, evidence suggests that such information can 
provide very valuable insights as it allows to proxy policy-induced tax revenues changes at a 
disaggregated level (i.e. for each specific tax basis), see in particular Morris et al. (2009). 
Existing country-level evidence suggests that discretionary measures play an important role 
in explaining short-run variations in apparent tax elasticities although the information 
available to date is still scant and limited to only a few countries.
2 For instance, Duchene and 
Levy (2003) show that the discretionary components were often, although not always, the 
most important component behind estimated changes in budget balance during the period 
1998-2004 in France. Using econometric analysis, Wolswijk (2007) also provides supportive 
evidence for the Netherlands on the need to net-out tax revenue series from discretionary 
measures in order to correctly assess short-run variations in apparent tax elasticities. 
These examples suggest that a consistent recording of discretionary measures affecting tax 
revenues across a wider range of EU countries could be instrumental to a better monitoring 
of fiscal developments. The availability of data on the impact of discretionary measures 
could, for instance, allow for a better understanding of the role played by non-policy factors 
such as, for instance, asset or oil prices, in driving short-run evolutions of tax revenues. 
These other factors can, in particular, interact with the effect of tax measures taken by 
governments on a discretionary basis such that the relationship between tax revenues and 
economic activity gets distorted. For instance direct tax cuts might be decided in the wake of 
buoyant tax revenue collection for tax categories that are known to be more volatile than 
others (e.g., corporate or property taxes) possibly reflecting premature assessments 
regarding the structural nature of tax revenues increases. Such data could thus provide a 
basis for an assessment of the causes of discrepancy between fiscal plans and outcome at 
the level of each specific tax category (i.e. consumption, corporate, social security 
                                                 
2 See in particular European Commission  (2008). 
  2contributions, etc.) which is currently usually done at a more aggregate level, see for 
instance Turrini (2008). More recently, the sharp deterioration of cyclical conditions linked 
to the financial crisis has led many EU countries to adopt stimulus measures under the 
European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP) which, on top of falling tax revenues linked to the 
economic contraction, are also likely to affect tax revenues through discretionary measures 
taken by governments and affecting for instance, VAT, reduced taxes on labour or tax 
exemptions related to car purchases.
3 
The absence of tax series netted of discretionary measures is problematic to the extent that 
tax revenues developments stemming from policy and/or legislative changes (or other 
indirect policy-induced measures affecting tax yields) cannot be distinguished from the 
endogenous behaviour of taxation systems i.e., the development in tax revenues due to the 
sole evolution of the tax bases in absence of discretionary measures. Following discussions 
undertaken in the context of the activities of the Output Gap Working Group of the 
Economic Policy Committee, the Commission services have launched in June 2008 a 
questionnaire in order to collect information on estimates of the impact of discretionary 
measures undertaken by the EU Member States. The analysis presented in this paper 
summarises the data received so far and provides first descriptive evidence and analysis. 
Such data of course suffers a number of drawbacks. In particular, differences in the 
accounting rules followed (i.e., data expressed in either accrual or cash) or in the definition 
of what constitutes a discretionary measure (i.e., differences in the “no- policy change 
assumption”), represent important limitations for cross-country comparison. Furthermore, 
as our paper shows, these tax revenue projections are made ex-ante and usually not revised 
ex-post such that their real value remains limited regarding an analysis of the permanent 
effect of discretionary measures on tax yields. There are a number of positive elements 
attached to this data, however. For instance this data is likely to reflect governments' views 
on the behaviour of tax revenues and tax systems when policy changes are implemented 
and thus makes it possible to analyse the discrepancy between fiscal plans and outcome at 
the level of each specific tax basis. This detailed information can in turn help re-construct the 
source of errors made for the total tax revenue projections which have sometimes been 
sizeable in the run-up to the financial crisis, see Barrios and Rizza (2010). For instance recent 
                                                 
3 See Communication for the Spring European Council, "Driving European recovery", COM(2009) 114. 
  3evidence suggests that the influence of composition effects, i.e., where differences between 
tax bases and the overall GDP growth rates dif f e r ,  h a v e  i n  s o m e  c a s e s  l e d  t o  l a r g e  t a x  
revenue surprises, see European Commission (2008). Using data on the impact of 
discretionary measures for each tax category thus also permits an assessment of budgetary 
slippages controlling for the influence of composition effects. The availability of data on 
discretionary measure also allows a more precise analysis of the relationship between fiscal 
policy and the business cycle. Traditionally, the expansionary or contractionary nature of 
fiscal policy changes is analysed using estimates of the real-time and ex-post business cycle 
position based on filtering techniques (such as the HP filter) or the production function 
approach to net out fiscal variables for their cyclical component, see for instance, Beetsma 
and Giuliodori (2008) and Cimadomo (2008) for recent studies of this type. Such proxies of 
the fiscal stance suffers from the inherent uncertainty related to the business cycle position 
in real time, however. Real-time forecast errors may therefore be confused with policy-led 
changes which make it difficult to gauge the fiscal stance using a cyclically-adjusted 
budgetary balance approach especially so in times of highly uncertain economic outlook. 
Although governments' ex-ante estimates on the impact of discretionary measures can 
equally suffer from wrong business cycle assessment, these are more likely to reflect 
governments' view (independently of a potential political bias) on the impact of tax changes 
or any other legislative measures affecting tax yields given that these are calculated for each 
specific tax category. The use of data on discretionary measure can therefore provide 
relevant complementary information to existing estimates of the fiscal stance. 
The data used in this paper cover a large number of EU countries and, although the time 
span and definitions of the impact of discretionary measures on tax revenues can vary across 
countries, this data allow us to uncover a number of important results. We find in particular 
that, although on average discretionary measures are relatively low compared to tax 
revenues levels, their incidence on tax elasticities (and thus on tax revenue changes in 
relation to the business cycle) can be very large and lead to significant departure between 
gross and net (for the effect of discretionary measures) tax elasticities which in turn affect 
the view on what the fiscal stance really is. In addition, our results show that discretionary 
measures taken by the EU countries in the run-up to the 2008/2009 global financial crisis 
were often pro-cyclical thus possibly explaining why countries that had experienced the 
  4most buoyant tax revenues during this period often find themselves in the most difficult 
budgetary situations once the full effects of the crisis on tax revenues unfold. Our results 
show in particular that generous tax break affecting direct taxes often lied behind pro-
cyclical fiscal policies. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 present the data collected by the 
Commission services on discretionary measures affecting tax revenues. Section 2 analyses 
the size and the relevance of discretionary measures for tax levels and variations.  In Section 
3 the methodology followed to net out discretionary measures from tax revenues is 
described. Section 4 analyses the differences between gross and net tax elasticities. Section 
5 examines, through descriptive statistics, the relation between discretionary measures and 
the business cycle while Section 6 investigates this relation by mean of econometric analysis. 
Section 7 summarises our results and discusses future possible use of the data on 
discretionary measures.  
 
2. Discretionary measures affecting tax elasticities: data collected by the European 
Commission 
Information on discretionary measures was collected in the context of the Output Gap 
Working Group (OGWG) of the Economic Policy Committee, covering a large sample of EU 
countries. Member States were invited to report on their estimates of the impact of 
discretionary measures for broad tax categories used in the calculation of overall budgetary 
sensitivity to the business cycle as described in Girouard and André (2005). Table 1 shows 
that the data start in 2000-2001 and end in 2007-2008 in most cases, although coverage 
varies across countries. Usually the data is recorded on an accrual basis or both in cash and 
accrual consistent with ESA95 standards.  
Tables 2 and 3 provide more detailed information on the data collected and methodology 
used by the Member States. Estimates on discretionary measures were made systematically 
available in nearly all EU countries and were in most cases in the responsibility of ministries 
of finances. In some cases data on measures concerning social security contribution is 
compiled by ministries of employment and social affairs (e.g., Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Portugal and Slovakia) and by other ministries (e.g., ministry for health). In 
other countries, the data are complemented by data produced by other institutions (e.g. 
external research institutes in Germany and the National Central Bank in Belgium). In some 
  5countries with largely decentralised public spending, regional governments also compile 
data on the impact of discretionary measures (Belgium, Germany). In certain cases not all 
detailed information is made public (Bulgaria, Malta) nor is the information regularly 
published (Hungary, Romania Luxemburg.). Furthermore, estimates are usually made ex-
ante in gross terms (i.e., without considering the impact of discretionary measures on tax 
bases) and in few specific cases ex-post revisions are undertaken. Table 3 summarises 
information on the methodology and definition used by the Member States to compile data 
on discretionary measures. The answers provided by the Member States show that data is 
recorded in 15 out of 21 cases on accrual or both accrual and cash basis, thus consistent with 
ESA95 definition. Six countries only compile estimates on a cash basis only: Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Romania. Estimates are usually made ex-ante in gross terms (i.e., 
without considering the impact of discretionary measures on tax bases) and only in few 
specific cases ex-post revisions are undertaken. The fact that the estimates provided by the 
Member States are in gross terms is only of minor importance given that the focus is on 
short-run variations of tax elasticities. Finally the information collected provides indication of 
the "no-policy change scenario" and, in particular, the consideration of price indexation 
mechanisms whenever relevant in building these scenarios. The "no policy change scenario" 
definition used is as a matter of fact fairly general being defined in most cases as if no 
changes were undertaken in the tax system including often country-specific issues related to 
indexation mechanisms and country-specificities. 
2. Discretionary measures affecting tax elasticities: how important are they? 
Table 4 provides summary statistics on the average annual shares of the discretionary 
measures in tax revenue by broad tax category.
4 In general, looking at an average for the 
sample of EU countries where relatively long term series are available, the effect of 
discretionary measures on total taxes tends to be relatively small (1,2% on average for all 
taxes). With respect to single tax categories, the average effect appears to be larger (2.6%) 
for direct taxes than for indirect taxes (1,1%) and social contribution (0,6%). However when 
considering yearly discretionary measures, their share in total revenues can in som e years 
account for considerable amount of the latter. Particular high values have been recorded for 
                                                 
4 The disaggregation into three broad tax categories was due to the unavailability of disaggregated information in a number of countries. 
Broad tax grouping, considering together personal and corporate income taxes) was thus opted for in order to ensure comparability of 
results across countries. 
  6some of the EU10 member states as Slovakia, Lithuania and Czech Republic.  The data 
reported in Table 4 also show that governments tend to lower tax revenues mainly by the 
means of direct taxes. In certain cases direct tax cuts are also financed by the increase of 
indirect taxes.
5 Such pattern can be observed for several countries as for instance Czech 
Republic and Slovakia which have followed such tax policy for an extended number of 
years.
6. Discretionary measures affecting social security contributions, on the other hand, 
have experienced less pronounced changes, excepting few cases such as the UK, which 
implement sizeable measures, although realized in one single year, to increase government 
revenues in this tax category. A more detailed investigation of the data suggests that the 
effects of discretionary measures are highly concentrated in time, which is also suggested by 
the large differences between average, maximum and minimum values reported in Table 4. 
 
3. Correcting the effects of discretionary measures on tax elasticities: Methodology. 
The size of discretionary measures can influence the value of apparent tax elasticities and, 
by the same token, that of the difference between these and the (estimated) constant 
elasticities used in EU fiscal surveillance. One should note in particular that discretionary 
measures can be taken in reaction to the perceived state of the economy so that tax 
windfalls/shortfalls can either be magnified or compensated by discretionary tax cuts/hikes. 
These different elements would result in (policy-induced) short-run variations in tax 
elasticities in response to business cycle developments so that differences between 
apparent and constant estimated elasticities may themselves have a strong policy-driven 
cyclical component.   
An immediate way to net-out the effect of discretionary measures would seem to simply 
subtract their annual amounts from the corresponding tax revenues figures. This simple 
approach, however, would not yield tax revenues series adjusted for the influence of 
discretionary measures taken in different years since it would implicitly assume that taxation 
systems remain unaffected. Changes in tax laws, which may be designed to address past 
fiscal imbalances or may be due to electoral outcomes, naturally make tax revenues for a 
                                                 
5  These evolutions could presumably reflect a shift between direct and indirect taxation. Recent evolutions in taxation revenues in the EU 
suggest that statutory corporate tax rates have experienced a marked decline while implicit tax rates on consumption have been on 
the rise in the EU since the end of the 1990s/early 2000s, see in particular European Commission (2008), Taxation trends in the 
European Union, Directorate General for Taxation and Customs Union and Eurostat. 
6 The effects of discretionary measures across tax categories can be detected also by graph 3 and graph 4 plotting the difference between 
gross and net tax elasticities for direct and indirect taxes. 
  7given year dependent of previous years' taxation revenues. It follows that a correction of tax 
revenues series for the impact of discretionary measures should consider all years where 
these measures have been taken. Considering a specific year t as the base year for instance, 
the correctly adjusted tax revenue series is the one that would prevail if the base year's tax 
structure had been in operation for the entire period. A simple approach, termed the 
"proportional adjustment method", can be used to adjust tax revenues for the impact of 
discretionary measures and thus allows a comparison of tax revenues strands across time.
7 
This approach, by adjusting for the dependence of tax revenues on discretionary measures, 
allows the calculation of apparent tax elasticities (based on annual tax revenue changes) net 
of the effect of discretionary measures in a consistent manner. Assume the following strand 




where t is the current year. Let the estimated tax revenue impact of discretionary measures 
in the years in which they occurred be: 
dm1,dm2,…dmt 
and assume that the adjusted (for the impact of discretionary measures) series of tax 
revenues are equal to: 
A1,A2,…At 
Ideally tax revenues A1-At should only reflect the effect of (endogenous) evolution of tax 
bases in order to derive correct measures of tax elasticities reflecting the sensitivity of tax 
revenues to the tax bases.
8 In order to compare tax revenues across the years one would 
like to abstract from changes in tax structures, i.e., discretionary measures. Considering a 
specific year (t) as the base year, one would thus like to obtain tax revenues series as if this 
specific year's tax structure had been in operation for the entire period. Since this specific 
year is taken as the base, one can thus write that: 
At = Tt 
                                                 
(
7)  This approach is described in  Barth and Hemphill (2000). 
8  This is assuming that tax bases currently used are perfect proxies of the true tax bases. In practice this assumption can be severely 
challenged however, as for instance, in the case of corporate taxes, see for instance, Girouard and André (2005). 
  8Tax revenue values for years 1 to t-1 must then be corrected in order for these to be 
comparable to the tax revenue in year t. Under the proportional adjustment assumption, the 
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More generally, each year the adjusted tax revenue can be written as: 


















   
The proportional adjustment method has been applied using the information on 
discretionary measures described above to calculate tax elasticities net of the effect of 
discretionary measures.  
 
4. Discretionary measures and tax elasticities: Descriptive Analysis. 
Graphs 1 and 2 provide a first set of descriptive statistics on the similarities and/or 
differences between gross and net apparent tax elasticities. Graph 1 shows that in general 
the two series are fairly highly correlated although in some cases (CZ direct taxes, DK indirect 
taxes, UK SSC), the co-movement between the two series appears to be weak. Although 
apparent gross and net tax elasticities appear to be fairly highly correlated in most cases, this 
should not obscure that the differences between the average values of the two series can 
sometimes be large. Graph 2 shows that the average level of gross tax elasticities tend to 
depart in a large number of cases from that of the tax elasticities netted for the effects of 
discretionary measures, especially for direct taxes, where gross elasticity is often lower than 
net elasticity
9. For indirect taxes the divergence between the two elasticities is lower, while 
for social security contributions the two series appear to be rather more similar. Since 
discretionary measures have often opposite sign across tax categories the average 
divergence between the two elasticities for total taxes is in many cases lower than for 
                                                 
9 As explained deeper in the followings section this divergence can be due either to tax cut in case of net rising elasticity or to tax hikes 
when net elasticity is on a downward path. 
  9specific taxes, nevertheless even a small deviation in the value of the elasticity can account 
for significant amounts of tax revenues. 
Graphs 3-6 plot the evolution over time of gross and net (of the effect of discretionary 
measures) apparent elasticity for each broad tax category and total tax revenues for selected 
countries and include indication of the value of the output gap taken from DG Ecfin Ameco 
database. The net elasticities are derived using the proportional adjustment method 
described in the previous section.
 For each tax category, the chosen tax base is the nominal 
GDP in order to ensure direct comparability with the benchmark OECD/Commission tax 
elasticities used to calculate the cyclically adjusted balance and also reported in Graph 3-6.
 10 
Apparent elasticities have therefore been computed by dividing the annual growth of the 
revenue series (both gross and net) with the nominal GDP annual growth rate.
 Apparent 
elasticities appear to be very volatile in the short-run and can sometimes substantially 
depart from the OECD/Commission benchmark, although in only few cases this difference is 
due to discretionary measures. The latter is confirmed by the fact that the original revenues 
series and the corrected series are highly correlated. The impact of discretionary measures 
on tax elasticity in certain countries/years is large, however, yielding substantial discrepancy 
between net and gross elasticity in these cases. 
Graph 3 provides results for the apparent elasticity of direct taxes with respect to GDP in 
selected countries. Both net and gross elasticities appear to be very volatile and tend to 
fluctuate around the OECD/Commission benchmark elasticities which reflect general 
business cycles variations as shown by the output gap values. Graph 4 performs a similar 
exercise for indirect taxes displaying also a high volatility of apparent tax elasticities and 
sometimes significant departure from the OECD/European Commission benchmark also due 
to overall output variations as indicated by the values of the output gap. Graph 5 which 
concerns tax elasticities of Social Security Contributions shows lower volatility for both net 
and gross elasticity and a smaller impact of discretionary measures on tax elasticities. Graph 
6 plots gross and net apparent elasticities of the total tax revenues with respect to nominal 
GDP for a sample of countries where data on the three broad tax categories were available. 
These results show that in certain cases the effect of discretionary measures on single broad 
tax categories produces substantial difference between gross and net elasticities, although in 
                                                 
10 The OECD/Commission tax elasticities are available in European Commission (2006). 
  10most cases such impact is not enough to divert the core trend in the elasticity motion. These 
results suggest that gross and net elasticities in total taxes tend often to be more similar 
since the relatively higher differences between the two elasticities in a specific tax category 
are compensated by opposite pattern in other tax categories resulting in counterbalancing 
overall effect on total elasticity. In synthesis in many cases discretionary measures offset 
each other. This pattern emerges clearly in the case of Czech Republic (1999) Slovakia and 
Latvia (2004) where direct tax cuts are offset by tax hikes in indirect tax.  
 
5. Discretionary measures and the business cycle: Descriptive analysis. 
In this section we investigate the relationship between discretionary measures and the 
business cycle. The aim of this section is to test the pro-cyclical bias of discretionary 
measures. According to this hypothesis, discretionary measures affecting tax revenues may 
be governed by business cycle evolutions: During good times, governments may undertake 
tax cuts assuming that good times will last long thus corresponding to structural evolution of 
the economy. The pro-cyclical behaviour during good times would force governments to 
implement vigorous consolidation plan during business cycle contraction to curb public 
deficits.  During slowdown or recession discretionary measures would therefore be aimed at 
increasing tax revenues rather than tend to stabilise output.  This behaviour would in turn 
have direct incidence on tax elasticities. Such assumptions are investigated more closely in 
this section. 
Graphs 3-6 provide a first idea on the pro or counter cyclical nature of discretionary 
measures by comparing the difference between net and gross tax elasticities and the output 
gap. For instance, for a given level of output growth, net tax elasticity will be higher than the 
gross tax elasticity in case of tax cuts given that the change in tax revenues in the gross case 
includes the tax cut while the change in tax revenues in the net case excludes it. Similarly, in 
case of tax increase, the net tax elasticity will be lower than the gross tax elasticity.   
Apparent net tax elasticities are higher than the gross tax elasticities when discretionary 
measures imply a negative variation of tax revenues (i.e. tax cut) and lower when 
discretionary measures represent a tax revenue increase.  The previous arguments can be 
illustrated by considering the simple case where the change in tax revenues is observed over 
a two years period, i.e. between t and t-1 such that the tax revenue net of the impact of 
  11discretionary measures in year t-1 is At-1 and can be written as follows using the proportional 
adjustment method: 
  t t
t




= − − 1 1
  
Where Tt is the gross tax level and DMt is the discretionary measure in year t (i.e. the base 
year). The variation in tax revenues net of discretionary measures between t-1 and t will be 
larger than the variation of gross tax revenues, if:  














that is if DMt < 0 
 
One could equally show that ΔAt < ΔTt if DMt > 0. 
Accordingly, during expansionary phases of the cycle, pro-cyclical discretionary measures 
would yield negative tax revenue variations and thus higher net tax elasticities than in a no-
policy change scenario while during slowdown discretionary measures would yield positive 
tax revenue variations compared to a no-policy change scenario, thus resulting in lower net 
tax elasticities.  
Considering for instance the general case of total tax elasticities depicted in Graph 4 one can 
observe that in 2003 discretionary measures have tended to be counter-cyclical in several 
countries such as Austria, Belgium, Finland and Denmark. Conversely in the same years a 
pro-cyclical impact of discretionary measures on tax elasticities can be observed in Portugal 
where despite a negative development in the Output Gap the governments have had to 
implement a fiscal retrenchment while the negative business cycle evolution drove the net 
elasticity down. The end of the period covered by the database seem to have been 
characterised mostly by pro-cyclical fiscal behaviour. This is especially apparent in the cases 
of Finland, Lithuania and to a minor extent in Belgium and Sweden in the years 2005/6-
2007/08. 
11     
Table 5 provides descriptive statistics on the variance of net and gross tax elasticities for 
each tax category together with the correlation between discretionary measures and the 
output gap. The first indicator provides information about the volatility of the two series 
while it does not give much information about the cyclical nature of discretionary measures. 
                                                 
11 One should note that output gap data are subjected to variations, sometimes substantial, over time. Hence, this analysis has to be 
regarded as an ex-post fiscal policy evaluation. At the time in which discretionary measures were implemented previous output gap 
computation might have led to different consideration about the cyclical nature of discretionary measures, however. 
  12While one could expect that pro-cyclical discretionary measures would induce higher 
variance of tax elasticities as they tend to amplify business cycle movements whilst counter-
cyclical discretionary policies would tend to reduce it although these hypotheses does not 
hold in many cases
12.  A better way to consider the pro or counter-cyclical nature of 
discretionary measures is taking into account their link with the output gap. This exercise is 
applied here using simple correlation coefficients.
13 A negative correlation coefficient would 
suggest that discretionary measures are pro-cyclical and a positive coefficient that they are 
counter-cyclical (i.e. counter-cyclical discretionary measures tend to increases tax revenues 
during expansionary phases and to decrease it during slowdown). The results shown in Table 
5 suggest that there seems to be no clear relationship between business cycle and 
discretionary measures, independently of the tax category considered, however. Cross-
country analysis does not allow identifying an unambiguous trend in discretionary measures 
behaviour although part of this might be due to differences in time span covered. In order to 
have an overall view on the cyclical nature of discretionary measures' Graph 7 compares, for 
a sample of country where data were available in the period of time considered in the 
charts, the aggregate share of discretionary measures in percentage of GDP and the average 
output gap in the corresponding year (these countries are Belgium, the Czech republic, 
Finland, France, Lithuania, Malta, Sweden and the UK). The result emphasizes that 
discretionary measures has been strongly pro-cyclical between 2001 and 2007 with 
discretionary measures increasing tax revenues during the early phase of this period while 
the output gap was low and declining and decreasing tax revenues once the output gap 
started to increase from 2003 on. The following section provide further econometric 
evidence on this issue. 
 
6. Discretionary measures and the business cycle: econometric analysis. 
The descriptive evidence provided in the previous sections, although suggesting that 
discretionary measures affecting tax revenues might have a pro-cyclical nature, are limited 
given the short time span considered. An econometric analysis has also been carried out by 
                                                 
12 Consider for instance only two years where net elasticity is supposed to remain constant from t-1 to t. In this 
situation despite their sign, discretionary measures (both pro-cyclical and counter-cyclical) would amplify 
gross tax elasticities changes, thus yielding larger variance for the gross serie without providing information 
on the cyclical nature of fiscal policy. 
  13pooling data across countries and years in order to palliate the short time and low number 
of countries available. Only countries covering a sufficiently long time period for each tax 
category are used in order to capture potential cyclical pattern of discretionary measures. 
The period covered by the estimations is 2001-2007 and the countries are Belgium, the 
Czech republic, Finland, France, Lithuania, Malta, Sweden and the UK. The following 
equation has been tested for this sample of countries: 
it t i t i OG DM ε β β + + = −1 , 1 0 ,           ( 1 )  
where DMi,t indicates the variation in tax revenues as a result of discretionary measures in 
percentage of GDP in country i in year t and OGi,t-1 is the level of output gap in year t-1 and 
represents the business cycle position.
14 The term εi,t is an error term which can be 
decomposed into two subcomponents: 
t i i t i , , λ α ε + =             ( 2 )  
The coefficient αi represents an unobserved country specific-effect and λi,t is an error term 
which is assumed to have the iid properties. Equation (1) is therefore estimated using panel 
fixed (within) estimator in order to remove the unobserved country-specific components 
which could influence the relationship between discretionary measures and the business 
cycle (this could be the case if, for instance, for unobserved historical or institutional reasons 
certain countries would tend to follow more pro-cyclical policies)  
Results of the estimation of Equation (1) are reported in Table 6 for discretionary measures 
concerning all taxes categories as well as for each tax category separately. Column (1) shows 
that the sign of the coefficient on the lagged output gap is negative and highly significant, 
indicating that discretionary measures tend to increase tax revenues when the output gap is 
lower and to decrease tax revenues when the output gap is higher, thus suggesting that 
discretionary measures affecting total taxes are pro-cyclical for the sample of countries and 
period covered. Column (2) includes additional control variables in the equation estimated, 
which are usually considered in the fiscal policy literature. These variables include two fiscal 
                                                                                                                                                         
13 The lagged output gap is used instead of the actual value in order to account for potential lag in fiscal policy 
setting and to avoid endogeneity issues. Section II provides a discussion and references on this point. 
14 As usual in the fiscal policy literature analysing the link between the fiscal stance and the business cycle, the output gap is 
observed in t-1, given that the fiscal stance measures the difference in budgetary position between year t and t-1. In 
addition, the use of lagged output gap allow to reduce potential endogeneity of discretionary measures affecting tax 
revenues, see in particular, European Commission (2006), Public Finance Report in EMU-2006, (Directorate General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs) for a review of the literature. 
  14indicators represented by the level of debt and the budgetary position in year t-1, where the 
expected sign of the estimated coefficients is negative on the debt variable and positive on 
the net lending position (assuming that discretionary measures are taken for fiscal 
consolidation, i.e. to reduce deficit and debt levels). In addition to the fiscal variables, two 
other variables are used: a dummy variable indicating whether in year t-1 general elections 
took place in country i, the expected sign being negative if tax reduction are used for 
electoral purposes; and an indicator measuring the quality of fiscal governance (where 
higher value indicates better fiscal governance) as this characteristic has been found to be 
relevant in the literature studying the pro-cyclical nature of fiscal policy.
15 Results of the 
estimation of the link between the output gap and discretionary measures, controlling for 
these other potential determinants are reported in Column (2) of Table 7 and show that the 
relationship between the lagged output gap and discretionary measures remains similar, i.e. 
negative and significant, while the value of the coefficient decreases slightly suggesting that 
the additional control variables capture a relatively small part of the link between 
discretionary measures affecting tax revenues and the business cycle. None of the other 
variables included in the equations are significant, however, excepting the net lending 
variable which displays a negative sign suggesting that countries with deteriorated 
budgetary balance in year t tend to adopt discretionary measures that tend to increase tax 
revenues thus pointing to fiscal consolidation.  
Similar estimations are undertaken for each tax category separately in Column (3) to (8). 
Results indicate that only direct taxes display the same result as total direct taxes, i.e., 
indicating that discretionary measures are pro-cyclical. This result, together with the 
descriptive evidence presented earlier indicate that direct taxes are more frequently used in 
a pro-cyclical way compared to other tax categories, i.e. to lower the tax burden during good 
times and to increase it during bad time and that this in turn would explain while 
discretionary measures affecting total tax revenues tend to pro-cyclical. The short sample of 
countries and time period considered suggest however that these results should be 
interpreted with caution and further robustness checks should be conducted over longer 
time spans and for more countries with further updates of the data. 
                                                 
15 For a description on the database on fiscal governance, see also European Commission (2006).  For evidence 
regarding the role played by fiscal institutions on the pro-cylical nature of fiscal policy, see Debrun et al. 
(2008). 
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7. Summary and conclusion 
This paper provides a first analysis of dat a  c o l l e c t e d  b y  t h e  E u r o p e a n  C o m m i s s i o n  o n  
countries' estimates of the impact of discretionary measures affecting tax revenues. This 
data shows that while estimates of the impact of discretionary measures affecting tax yields 
are made systematically in most EU countries, current practices and methods used to 
compile these data vary greatly across EU Member States, in part reflecting country-specific 
institutional settings, while this data is not systematically published or updated. In addition, 
the "no policy change scenario" definition used is often fairly general being defined in most 
cases as if no changes were undertaken in the tax system and in some cases including 
references to price indexation mechanisms. Furthermore the paper examines the impact of 
discretionary measures on tax revenues, tax elasticity and their link to the business cycle in 
the run-up to the global financial crisis. While discretionary measures are found to represent 
only a small share of total tax revenues on average, apparent tax elasticities are found to 
depart in many instances from their value in absence of such measures. Given that 
discretionary measures can significantly affect tax elasticities, they can also alter the 
relationship between tax revenues and the business cycle which plays a key role in the EU 
fiscal surveillance framework. In order to investigate this issue we test econometrically the 
link between the impact of discretionary measures on tax revenues and the output gap for a 
sample of countries for which comparable data was available.  Our results suggest that 
discretionary measures affecting tax revenues were often pro-cyclical, whereby 
governments tend to implement tax cuts during expansionary phases while resorting to tax 
increases during periods of slowdown. We also find that such feature was predominantly 
relevant for direct taxes. 
The results presented in this paper should be seen as preliminary to the extent that in most 
cases the time span covered is relatively short (7 to 8 years) and that definition and no-policy 
change scenarios are not homogenous across countries. Despite these caveat, such data and 
future analyses based on it would provide valuable complementary information for EU fiscal 
surveillance: (i) by providing elements for a backward assessment of fiscal plans vs. 
outcomes making use of information specific to the tax categories used in the EU fiscal 
surveillance framework and (ii) by promoting greater harmonisation and exchange of views 
  16across EU countries regarding the no-policy change assumptions used in order to make 
medium-term projections on the impact of discretionary measures on tax revenues. 
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  18Table 1 Results from questionnaire sent to the Member States 






Austria 2000-08 2000-08 2000-08 Cash and accrual Gross and net
Belgium 2001-07 2001-07 2004-08 Cash and accrual Gross
Bulgaria 2004-08 2004-08 2004-08 Cash Gross
Cyprus 2002-04 2002-04 2002-04 Cash Gross
Czech Republic 1995-08 1995-08 1995-08 Cash and accrual Gross
Denmark 2001-07 2001-07 N/A Cash Gross and net
Estonia 2006-09 2006-09 06-09 Cash Gross and net
Spain 1999-08 1999-08 N/A Cash and accrual Gross and net
Finland 2001-08 2001-08 01-08 Cash Gross
France 2001-07 2001-07 2001-07 Accrual Gross
Germany N/A N/A N/A Cash and accrual Gross and net
Italy 2001-07 2001-07 N/A Cash and accrual Gross
Lithuania 2001-07 2001-07 2001-07 Cash and accrual Gross and net
Latvia 2002-07 2002-07 2002-07 Cash Gross and net
Malta 2001-07 2001-07 2001-07 Accrual Gross
Netherlands Since 1991 Since 1991 Since 1991 Cash and accrual Gross and net
Portugal 2002-08 2002-08 2002-08 Cash and accrual Gross
Romania 2005-07 2005-07 2005-07 Cash Gross
Sweden 2000-09 2000-09 2000-09 Accrual Gross and net
Slovenia 2003-07 2003-07 2003-07 N/A Gross
Slovakia 2004-09 2004-09 2004-09 Accrual Net
UK 2001-12 2001-12 2001-12 Accrual Net
Time periods covered Accounting
 
Source: Commission services based on replies to the questionnaire on discretionary measures 
Notes: While Germany and the Netherlands provided replies to the questionnaire, these countries referred to 
their respective national publication for the collection of the data and were thus not included in the analysis. 
  19Table 2: Availability and production of estimates on impact of discretionary measures






  20Table 3: Methodology and definition for the collection of estimates of the impact of 


















  22Table 4: Annual shares of discretionary measures in tax revenue levels: average 2001-2007 
 
country average* minimum maximum average* minimum maximum average* minimum maximum average* minimum maximum
AT 3 , 0- 4 , 87 , 70 , 6- 0 , 42 , 70 , 1- 0 , 50 , 21 , 4- 2 , 32 , 9
BE 2,4 -4,3 0,3 0,9 0,9 1,7 0,4 -1,2 0,1 0,7 -1,2 0,1
CZ 3,7 -12,6 0,0 3,0 0,0 12,4 1,1 -0,4 1,7 1,5 -1,8 3,7
DK 0 , 7- 2 , 40 , 7- 0 , 70 , 8 0 , 6N / AN / AN / AN / AN / AN / A
FI 2,9 -4,1 -2,5 0,4 -1,6 0,5 0,9 -2,5 1,3 1,5 1,2 2,4
FR 2,6 -5,9 2,2 0,2 -0,2 0,6 0,7 -1,1 1,0 0,8 0,8 1,7
IT 2 , 1- 6 , 42 , 00 , 5- 1 , 40 , 4N / AN / AN / AN / AN / AN / A
LT 5,6 -12,4 2,9 1,5 -4,7 0,9 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,8 -4,1 0,4
LV 2,4 -3,3 -1,2 2,3 0,3 6,5 0,9 0,0 2,0 0,6 -0,8 0,9
MT 1,6 -3,9 1,9 1,7 -0,8 3,5 0,1 0,0 0,6 1,3 -1,0 0,7
PT 2,1 -3,2 5,4 1,5 0,0 4,4 0,5 0,0 2,2 1,3 -0,2 3,8
SE 2 , 6- 7 , 21 , 20 , 3- 0 , 20 , 80 , 3- 0 , 80 , 21 , 2- 2 , 80 , 7
SK 4,5 -19,4 3,7 3,1 -4,5 2,3 0,7 -4,9 2,2 1,9 -4,7 2,9
UK 0,1 -0,5 0,3 0,3 -0,8 0,0 1,3 0,0 8,9 0,3 -0,5 2,0
Average 2 , 6- 6 , 41 , 81 , 1- 0 , 92 , 70 , 6- 1 , 01 , 71 , 2- 1 , 51 , 9
* absolut values average
** sample average
all taxes* Direct taxes Indirect taxes SSC
 







































Austria 6,5 1,2 0,7 0,1 0,2 -0,3 0,1 0,1 -0,1 0,7 0,2 0,6
Belgium 0,3 0,3 -0,4 0,3 0,3 -0,4 0,3 0,2 0,8 0,0 0,1 -0,3
Czech Rep 0,9 2,0 -0,1 0,3 0,5 0,3 0,2 0,2 -0,4 1,3 1,3 0,1
Denkmark 0,6 0,8 0,5 0,1 0,0 0,6 - - - 0,4 0,6 0,6
Finland 1,9 1,3 0,3 1,7 3,0 0,6 0,3 0,2 -0,3 0,3 0,2 0,2
France 1,1 0,7 -0,7 0,2 0,2 -0,3 0,2 0,2 -0,8 0,1 0,0 -0,8
Italy 1,8 1,4 0,2 0,5 0,4 -0,2 - - - 0,4 0,2 0,2
Lituhania 0,6 0,7 -0,8 0,2 0,2 -0,1 - - - 0,0 0,1 -0,9
Latvia 0,1 0,1 -0,6 0,2 0,3 0,2 0,1 3,8 0,7 0,2 0,1 0,4
Malta 19,3 15,6 0,1 9,4 5,8 -0,1 - - - 5,5 3,7 -0,3
Portugal 3,3 6,5 0,6 1,8 0,9 -0,2 - - - 0,2 0,5 -0,6
Slovakia 0,4 0,1 0,3 0,3 0,2 -0,7 0,2 0,1 0,6 0,3 0,2 0,2
Sweden 3,4 2,5 -0,4 1,5 1,5 -0,1 2,0 1,9 -0,1 2,0 1,7 -0,4
U.K 0,9 0,9 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,9 0,3 0,4 -0,2 2,8 2,7 0,3
Direct taxes Indirect taxes SSc
 
Notes: Results based on replies to the questionnaires submitted to the Member States and Commission services' 
calculations 
 
  23Table 6: Econometric estimation of the link between the output gap and discretionary 
measures. Panel (fixed-effect) estimations 
  Total taxes  Direct taxes  Indirect taxes  Social security contributions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Output  gap  -0.046*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.031*** -0.007  -0.004 -0.001 0.000 
  (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
Debt   -0.001   -0.004    0.001    0.001 
   (0.006)   (0.005)    (0.003)    (0.002) 
Net  lending   -0.047***   -0.014    -0.009    -0.008* 
   (0.015)   (0.013)    (0.008)    (0.004) 
General  elections   -0.056   -0.037    -0.022    0.002 
   (0.044)   (0.038)    (0.025)    (0.013) 
Fiscal  rules   0.045   -0.017    0.025    0.028 
   (0.066)   (0.056)    (0.037)    (0.019) 
Constant -0.054**  -0.092  -0.101***  0.105  0.026**  -0.045  0.004  -0.055 
  (0.022) (0.294) (0.017) (0.253) (0.011)  (0.164)  (0.006)  (0.085) 
Observations  55 55 55 55 55  55  55  55 
Number of 
countries 
8 8 8 8 8  8  8  8 
R-squared  0.38 0.54 0.36 0.41 0.06  0.12  0.01  0.13 
F test for fixed 
effects 
4.66*** 2.27**  2.57**  1.53  3.43***  2.43**  2.16*  0.86 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
The period covered by the estimations is 2001-2007 and the countries are Belgium, the Czech republic, Finland, France, Lithuania, 
Malta, Sweden and the UK. 
 












AT BE CZ DK FI FR IT LT LV MT PT SE UK
direct taxes indirect taxes SSC
 
Note: Correlation calculated  across periods indicated in Table 1. Countries with less than four 
years of observations are not reported 
Source: Commission services based on data provided by Member States 
 
Graph 2: Difference in level between gross and net tax elasticities 
























































Note: Average across period 2001-2007.  
Source: Commission services based on data provided by Member States 
 
  25Graph 3 : Gross and net (for the impact of discretionary measures) tax elasticities to GDP 
and output gap: Direct taxes 
Output Gap (left axes) Elasticity (right axes)








































































































































































































































































































output gap gross elasticity net elasticity OECD elasticity  
  26Graph 4: Gross and net (for the impact of discretionary measures) tax elasticities to GDP 
and output gap: Indirect Taxes 
 

































































































































































































































































































output gap gross elasticity net elasticity OECD elasticity
 
  27Graph 5: Gross and net (for the impact of discretionary measures) tax elasticities to GDP 
and output gap: Social security contributions 
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  28Graph 6: Gross and net tax elasticities to GDP and output gap: Overall tax revenues 
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  29Graph 7: Aggregate share of discretionary measure in percent of GDP and the output gap.  


















































tax revenues, % GDP
 
Notes: Output Gap series is built as weighted average of the sample of countries for whose data were available 
in the years considered. The countries concerned are Belgium, the Czech republic, Finland, France, Lithuania, 
Malta, Sweden and the UK. 
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